The Neo-Evangelical Mirage

Relevance Strategies That Win Crowds and Lose the Church

Recently it has occurred to me that neo-evangelicals are still by and large repeating the contextualization mistakes that ensnared Bill Hybels and Rick Warren in previous generations. They remain drawn to the pursuit of certain demographics they believe will grant them a cultural advantage, and in the short term it appears as if this strategy is correct. Yet the end result is always the same. The church becomes marginalized as the superficial glow that once made it appear bright dims with changing social conditions.

To understand this problem requires some background on what neo-evangelicalism is and what it attempts to accomplish. I have written about this at greater length in my book Social Justice Goes to Church, but it is enough to say that since the 1950s neo-evangelicals have been an identifiable group of Christians who have attempted to preserve orthodox theology, similar to the fundamentalists, while also seeking to regain the cultural influence that the rise of modernity and theological liberalism helped destroy. Their methods for reclaiming social relevance revolve around pursuing dominance in fields that modern people, who have discounted the Bible’s authority, consider important.

Fuller Seminary broadened its curriculum to include social activism, psychology certifications, and modern business techniques in order to appeal to a changing demographic that considered these fields more authoritative than the “old old story” fundamentalists still wore on their sleeves at their humble but allegedly academically unimpressive Bible institutes. It does not take a detective to see that Christianity Today, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the Evangelical Theological Society have all drifted from their Bible roots in an attempt to seek relevance and approval.

This pursuit of relevance, with the assumption that Christianity as usual is not relevant, put neo-evangelicals on the path to all kinds of cultural engagement and church growth strategies. Progressive evangelicals believed the church had failed to live up to its own social teachings on matters such as the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. In order to be more biblical, the church would need to incorporate New Left ideas that were, after all, considered biblical by the advocates of this approach. From Ron Sider to Russell Moore, this social-justice-infused evangelicalism has ensured a seat for evangelicals in the last row on the Progressive Left bus.

Though most evangelical Christians are on the political Right for obvious reasons, the Religious Right decided to cut a deal with the Republican Party machine under George Bush rather than maintain its independent populist position. Evangelicals gained a seat at the table and a pat on the back, but were not able to advance their moral agenda very far under this arrangement. I wrote about this last year for American Reformer.

Of course, the neo-evangelicals who gained the most ministry-related attention were the church growth moguls. There are numerous places one could begin the story. Perhaps the Jesus Movement of the 1970s and the replacement of old hymns and liturgies with contemporary music and a more open atmosphere intended to seem authentic. Or perhaps the 1990s, when superficial suburban middle-class tastes motivated a low-commitment, simplified, and artificial theatrical church with a stage that served as an off-ramp from traditional Christianity. Some have called this the “me church,” where personal preference outweighed theological devotion. To be fair, what came after it, even as a reaction, was often just as centered on personal preference.

There has been a great deal of argument recently about the damage “third way” thinking has done to the church’s reputation. I criticized this approach years ago, but for a different reason than many of the more recent critiques.

Pastor Tim Keller’s style of third-way thinking was practically accepted as the norm when I was at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary throughout the 2010s. So was David Platt’s “radical” form of high-commitment living, which was supposed to rebuke previous “seeker-sensitive” models, even though it was just as “purpose driven” and shallow as Rick Warren’s configuration.

The root issue I saw was not simply that a supposed third way between conservative and liberal would tether Christian moral positions to changing cultural dynamics or guarantee compromise when one side was right and the other was wrong, though these are legitimate concerns. My main problem was that the third way was, at its core, a blue-city contextualization strategy intended to allow Republicans (who most evangelicals were) and Democrats to worship together without serious offense given to either. The motive was wrong from the beginning.

Why not simply preach the truth, apply it to current circumstances, and do so for the sheep who hear God’s voice? Let the chips fall where they may. This does not mean a lack of awareness. For example, when preaching against abortion, part of preaching the full counsel of God to one’s congregation will likely include preaching the forgiveness God offers to those who have committed the sin of aborting their children. They are likely sitting in the congregation and need this assurance. But this does not mean sugar-coating or deemphasizing the things God emphasizes in His Word.

In the early 2000s I remember clearly the rise of the emergent church. Eventually it became evident that they were directly tampering with doctrine, and this is what separated their movement from mainstream evangelicalism. Yet lighter versions of what they attempted continued. Tim Keller’s third way became a popular contextualization strategy by attempting to transcend the right-left political divide at a time when that divide was becoming impossible to ignore. Evangelicals had a poor reputation in blue areas for their culturally conservative positions, and Tim Keller offered a way to soften that perception. He only massaged the doctrines of sin and hell, unlike Doug Pagitt and Brian McLaren who outright denied them.

Another contextualizer was Mark Driscoll, though contemporary evangelicals often want to forget how popular he was. He provided a template for reaching blue cities as well. He did not have the sophisticated public-intellectual persona that helped Tim Keller appeal to NPR listeners in New York City. Instead he adopted a more aggressive in-your-face approach to issues such as sexuality, once considered taboo to teach on in graphic terms in evangelical circles. Driscoll was not only graphic at times, but also used profane language, shouted at his audience, and dressed in a more casual blue collar way.

When his satellite-church empire collapsed after his dismissal, so did his contextualization strategy. Keller then became the main template and the one The Gospel Coalition and other influential neo-evangelical organizations championed in their quest to reach the young post-Christian millennial.

In a way, the political instincts of Richard Mowe and the church-growth appeal of Willow Creek types found their nexus in Keller’s Redeemer Presbyterian Church. Where else in the evangelical world would someone commission an audit to determine how comfortable LGBTQ people felt in a major congregation? I remember a friend of mine who attended on occasion telling me how many single adults in their thirties and forties were present. Perhaps it worked. But what exactly about it worked?

While David Platt and Tim Keller tapped into the dissatisfaction millennials had with the fundamentalist or 1990s seeker-sensitive version of church they grew up with, another generation was emerging with an outlook incompatible with this new contextualization strategy.

Younger millennials and zoomers grew up in a media-driven world completely destabilized by moral anarchy and the broken families it produced. If anything, the anti-Christian portion of this demographic is very anti-Christian. There is no accommodation that will attract them to a church that brands itself as “not your grandfather’s church.” They do not care. Meanwhile, another portion of this generation wants something solid and rooted to belong to, and the gimmicky church with the drywall, bank photography, and rock band does not appeal to them.

The inevitable reaction from neo-evangelicals is to formulate a new strategy. One that attempts to address the felt needs of a demographic accustomed to chaos, bleak economic prospects, and moral instability. Ironically, more liturgical churches outside the evangelical tradition, such as Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, appear well positioned to receive some of these people without changing anything about themselves. The neo-evangelicals who reinvent themselves every decade will find it difficult to persuade a generation looking for stability that they possess it.

Some may argue that evangelical doctrine is stable, given that it is rooted in the Solas of the Reformation. This is true, but the emphasis of the past fifty years has been on outward aesthetics and novel ways to do church. More traditional forms of Protestantism, including fundamentalism, that have kept their liturgies and doctrine, are well positioned to benefit from renewed interest in older forms of religion.

Another strategy that I already see emerging is the attempt to attract Gen Z males by catering to their grievances and reinforcing their sense of victimhood. Many of them are indeed victims of severe social engineering against men, and white men in particular, unlike anything our country has previously seen. Through managerialism, HR departments, and DEI every institution has betrayed them, but perhaps the church has not. Perhaps the church can position itself as the one place where Gen Z men can find encouragement and support.

Recognizing this, the next steps are extremely important and will shape the future of the fractured neo-evangelical movement. Either neo-evangelicals can abandon the contextualization project, or they can lean into it more intensely. It will be difficult to discern which course is being taken in the initial stages, but it will become clear soon enough.

A church that decides to preach the full counsel of God, let the chips fall where they may, offer a clarion call to all kinds of people in its local community, and lean into the doctrines and traditions that have made the church a unique institution will become a healthy place. Even if its growth is slower on the margins, it will be good growth that adds not only numbers but maturity. It will attract people who are interested in God, church, and service.

A church that decides to target Gen Z males in particular by reinforcing their grievances with boomers, Jews, women, and others, whether those grievances are legitimate or not, will enter a tailspin it cannot avoid. A constructive providential view of life’s transitory struggles will be seen as downplaying the concerns of young men. An intergenerational church filled with wisdom will be harder to maintain. The congregation will demand a continuous level of hostility toward its perceived enemies, including the moral elevation of secular masculine figures over Christian leaders who failed them. I already see signs of this taking shape, and it is not because neo-evangelicals tested it in a lab. It is because the mentality of neo-evangelicalism is to chase growth instead of chasing Christ as a means to growth.

I have not yet mentioned the prominent churches that will inevitably double down on their third-way blue-city strategy. These churches will simply diminish in influence, even if it takes some time. Either that or they will intensify their progressive credentials in order to continue pursuing the demographic they always sought. In that case, their end will resemble that of the mainline churches.

If there is any hope for evangelical theology, it will be found in abandoning the neo-evangelical pursuit of novelty and influence at the expense of tradition and theology.